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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether the district court erred as a matter of law by concluding that 
there was no basis for an award of attorneys' fees under the Private 
Attorney General Doctrine unless: (a) Plaintiffs successful advocacy of the 
constitutional and statutory rights of the majority of Davis County voters 
who approved public water fluoridation results in a monetary benefit and 
creates a common fund out of which fees can be paid; and (b) the actions of 
county officers are undertaken in bad faith. 
In Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759, 783 (Utah 1994), 
the Court made the Private Attorney General Doctrine applicable in Utah "when the 
'vindication of a strong or societally important public policy' takes place and the 
necessary costs in doing so 'transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an 
extent requiring subsidization,'" (citing Serrano v. Priest 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 
1977)). On appeal, "the appropriate standard for reviewing equitable awards of attorney 
fees is abuse of discretion." Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, Tf20. However, the district 
court erred as a matter of law by grafting two fee award requirements onto the Stewart 
decision which are contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's enunciation of the doctrine: (1) 
conferral of a monetary benefit and creation of a common fund from which attorneys' 
fees can be paid; and (2) bias on the part of public officers. Because this Court reviews 
questions of law under a correction of error standard, the trial court's determination of the 
legal standards to be applied should be reviewed without deference. Wilson Supply, Inc. 
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v. Fraden Mfg. Corp., 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2002). Nor is this Court bound by the district 
court's characterization of its conclusions of law as "findings of fact," and they are 
reviewed for correctness. Gilmore v. Wright 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993). 
2. Whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in denying Plaintiffs 
attorneys' fees under the Private Attorney General Doctrine by concluding that the 
case was "unique but not extraordinary," in disregard for its own conclusions of 
law that: (a) the issues presented by Plaintiff are of great importance to the general 
public; (b) the lawsuit raised important and unique issues concerning the right of 
the people to legislate directly; (c) to allow [the unlawful initiative] petition to be 
placed on the ballot would effectively render the referenda provisions of the Utah 
Constitution and the Utah Code meaningless; (d) allowing the [unlawful initiative] 
petition on the ballot would permit the sponsors to misuse the peoples' direct 
legislative power to thwart the will of the majority of Davis County voters; and (e) 
Davis County voters have a real and substantial interest in ensuring that the laws 
of initiative and referenda are scrupulously followed and the election process 
adheres to the rule of law. 
Each of these conclusions of law was found and recited by the district court in its 
Ruling issued October 15, 2002, and they were incorporated by reference in the Order 
filed on October 3, 2003. Each reference underscores the public importance of the result 
achieved by the Plaintiff in its successful vindication of the rights of the majority, indeed 
all, of Davis County voters. Collectively, they describe the Plaintiffs victory as the very 
kind of "vindication of strong or societally important public policy" at the core of the 
Stewart decision regarding the Public Attorney General Doctrine. The district court's 
"finding of fact" that the case was "unique" but not "extraordinary" (and therefore 
outside the context of the Public Attorney General Doctrine) is a conclusion of law, and 
is a distinction without a difference. A finding that the case was "unique" is tantamount 
to a finding that it was "extraordinary." This Court reviews questions of law under a 
2 
correction of error standard, and the trial court's determination of the legal standards to 
be applied should be reviewed without deference. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. 
Corp., 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2002). Nor is this Court bound by the district court's 
characterization of its conclusions of law as "findings of fact," and they are reviewed for 
correctness. Gilmore v. Wright 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993). 
3. Whether the district court erred in finding no evidence of bad faith, bias, or 
abdication of duties despite a pattern of unlawful and improper official actions by 
county officers over the course of two years in support of their personal oppositioi 
to fluoridation, culminating in their placement on the ballot of an unconstitutiona 
and illegal revote petition, and thereby effectively depriving all Davis Counts 
voters of due process and the right to impartial decisions regarding ballot integrity. 
The Stewart standards do not require a finding of bad faith, bias, or abdication o 
duty. Even so, Plaintiff presented evidence of bias, which consisted of the officia 
records of the County Commission (and the absence thereof), documents prepared by th( 
Clerk, and the unrefuted admissions of the County officers who testified at the August 7 
2003 evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees. In making it: 
findings of fact regarding lack of official bias, the district court mechanically adopted th( 
blanket findings prepared by the Defendant, with no reference to any of the specify 
testimony and exhibits before the court, even though Plaintiff timely submitted ai 
alternative and specific set of proposed findings. There is nothing to explain why thi 
court gave no consideration to the evidentiary issues raised by the Plaintiff in its propose* 
alternate findings before issuing its Order. See Bover Company v. Lignell 567 P.2< 
1112 (Utah 1977). Normally, the trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed wher 
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they are based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence. See 50 West Broadway v. 
Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989). However, "A trial court's findings 
cannot be made up out of whole cloth; substantial, competent evidence must exist which 
supports the findings, and when a finding of fact is not so supported, it must be rejected." 
Id., citations omitted. 
Whether particular conduct constitutes bad faith, bias, or abdication of duties is a 
mixed question of law and fact. On appeal, "Mixed questions of law and fact are 
reviewed for abuse in discretion in applying the law to the facts." Bishop v. Gentec, 48 
P.3d 218 (Utah 2002), citations omitted. "With respect to mixed questions of fact and 
law, we will review the underlying facts under the deferential clear error standard; 
however, the legal effect of those facts is within the province of the appellate court, and 
'no deference need be given a [lower] court's resolution of such questions of law.'" 
Mackay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998), citations omitted. The district court's 
findings exceed the limits of reasonability. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Where all of the taxpayer-funded resources of a county are arrayed to promote and 
defend an unconstitutional and unlawful initiative to overturn a vote of the people, does 
the Private Attorney General Doctrine justify an award of attorneys' fees to a plaintiff 
who successfully vindicates the people's constitutional and statutory rights to have the 
laws of initiative and referenda scrupulously enforced? 
In the general election of 2000, a majority of Davis County voters enacted water 
fluoridation as the law of the County. On August 6, 2002, following extended discussion 
of a self-styled "initiative petition," the County Commission, without allowing opposing 
comment, allowed the unconstitutional and unlawful petition to go on the ballot by 
default. On August 15, 2002, Plaintiff Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. filed 
an action seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction barring the County Clerk from 
placing the unlawful petition on the ballot. 
Following a hearing on September 13, 2002, the district court issued a verbal order 
granting the injunction sought by Plaintiff, which was formalized in a Ruling issued by 
the court on October 15, 2002. In that Ruling, the court decided in Plaintiffs favor on all 
causes of action, granted a permanent injunction, and reserved the question of Plaintiffs 
attorneys' fees for later consideration and disposition. 
Plaintiff filed its Motion for Attorneys' Fees on October 30, 2002, requesting an 
award of fees in the amount of $45,034.15, citing the applicability of the Private Attorney 
General Doctrine enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart v. Utah Public 
Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759,783 (Utah 1994). The Defendants did not dispute the 
reasonableness of the fees sought, but opposed the Motion, asserting that Stewart should 
not be applied to this case because no common fund had been created and any award of 
fees would be punitive in nature against the Defendants. An evidentiary hearing was held 
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on August 7, 2003 on the Motion for Attorneys' Fees, and the following day, the court 
explained its reasons for denying the Motion in a telephone conference with counsel. 
In response to the court's request, counsel for the Defendants drafted an order 
incorporating all of the findings and conclusions of the October 15, 2002 Ruling. The 
Defendants' draft order was submitted to the Plaintiff, and Plaintiff timely submitted an 
alternate draft to the court and counsel which Plaintiff believed more accurately reflected 
the state of the evidence adduced at the August 7th hearing. Without further conference 
discussion between the court and counsel, (that was itself unusual given the number of 
such conferences preceding the October 15, 2002 Ruling), the court issued its final Order 
on October 3, 2003 (the Defendants' draft). On October 31, 2003, Plaintiff Utahns for 
Better Dental Health-Davis filed its Notice of Appeal: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc., is a Utah nonprofit 
corporation organized specifically to advocate the benefits of fluoridation in Davis 
County. Many members of the Davis County Board of Health (including five Chairs) and 
other concerned Davis County citizens, from 1998 through the end of 2000, were 
instrumental in forming and directing the activities of Plaintiff. Plaintiff was significantly 
involved in obtaining the legislative changes which enabled the County Commission to 
place the fluoridation question on the 2000 ballot, and Plaintiff was significantly involved 
in the 2000 county-wide vote on fluoridation. (R. at 279.) 
In the general election held on November 7, 2000, the voters of Davis County 
approved the addition of fluoride to the public water supplies by a vote of 44,403 in favor 
to 40,950 opposed. Of the 85,353 voters who responded to that ballot question, 52% 
favored fluoridation; 48% opposed fluoridation. (R. at 277.) 
As mandated by the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111(2), on April 5, 
2001, the Davis County Health Department issued its order to operators of public water 
systems that such operators add fluoride to those systems on or before May 1, 2002. As 
of August 15, 2002, when Plaintiff filed its action, approximately 25% of the water 
systems in Davis County were fluoridated. (R. at 277.)l 
On May 1, 2001, even prior to receipt of an application to circulate a petition, the 
County Clerk, Mr. Steve Rawlings, sent an e-mail message (R. at 806, EX 9) to Mr. 
David Hansen, who was a principal sponsor of a petition seeking a revote, committing 
that the petition would be placed on the 2002 ballot if the sponsors submitted the 
necessary number of signatures prior to the filing deadline. 
On May 8, 2001, having already been assured by the Clerk that their revote 
petition would go on the 2002 ballot if they filed the signatures on time, the petition 
sponsors filed their application with the Clerk to circulate their "initiative petition," 
which they titled "Revote on Mandatory Fluoridation Acf requesting: (a) a "Repeal of 
prior action;" (b) that a re-vote on fluoridation be held: and (c) that county voters again 
1
 Parenthetically, as of January 31, 2004, all 18 public water systems in Davis County 
were in compliance with the Health Department's April 5, 2001 order. Implementation of 
the 2000 voter mandate has taken three years. 
7 
be asked the question (in language identical to the 2000 ballot question), "Shouldfluoride 
be added to the public water supplies within Davis County?" (R. at 806, EX 10.) 
In May 2001, when the Clerk approved the revote petition for circulation, he had 
made no analysis of its legality. 
One year later, at the County Republican Convention in May 2002, the Clerk 
(Steve Rawlings) and other County elected officials signed the revote petition, including 
Commission Chairman Dannie McConkie and County Attorney Mel Wilson. (R. at 874-
65; R. at 768.) 
The sponsors of the revote petition filed their completed signature sheets with the 
Clerk on or before July 8, 2002. (R. at 874-69.) 
Without making any analysis of legality, on July 9, 2002, the Clerk certified the 
unvetted petition as an Initiative Petition, and by letter (R. at 806, EX 12) delivered it to 
the County Commission. 
The Clerk knew when he sent the petition to the Commission that if the 
Commission rejected the petition or took no action on it, it would go on the ballot. (R. at 
874-106.) By doing so, the Clerk positioned the unlawful petition so that its sponsors, 
who wanted to overturn the vote of the people, would not have to pay any of the costs 
when its legality was contested. 
On August 6, 2002, the County Commission formally took up the matter of the 
petition. It was allowed to go on the ballot by default, and the Commission refused to 
allow any opposing comment. (R. 806, EX 1; R. at 874-156.) 
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On August 15, 2002, Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the petition was 
unconstitutional and unlawful, and asked the court to enjoin the petition's placement on 
the ballot. (R. at 1.) 
On September 16, 2002, the district court ruled in Plaintiffs favor, and enjoined 
the County officers from placing the petition on the ballot. (R. at 148.) 
On October 15, 2002, the district court issued its formal Ruling. The court held 
that the "revote petition" was actually a referendum which had not been timely filed. (R. 
at 283.) The court also found, as a matter of law, that the petition was unlawful even as 
an initiative. (Id.) Finally, the court found, as a matter of law, that "the Clerk's decision 
to allow the Initiative Petition to be placed on the ballot violates Utah's constitutional and 
statutory law governing initiatives and referenda." (R. at 284.) Based on that, the court 
granted Plaintiffs request for a permanent injunction barring the petition from being 
placed on the ballot. (Id.) The court reserved the issue of Plaintiffs attorneys' fees. (R. 
at 286.) 
On November 7, 2002, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Attorneys' Fees, together with 
a memorandum of law (R. at 296-305) and accompanying affidavits from counsel 
describing in detail the hours spent on the case. (R. at 307-320.) The combined 
attorneys' fees sought by David Irvine, Janet Jenson, and Andy Stavros are $45,034.15. 
(R. at 310.) The Defendants have not contested the fees sought by Plaintiff, as to their 
reasonableness, and in various arguments before the court have so stipulated. 
The parties filed reply and rebuttal memoranda on the Motion for Attorneys' Fees, 
together with several affidavits which related to Plaintiffs assertion that the Defendants' 
decision to place the petition on the 2002 general election ballot was motivated by the 
Clerk's personal antagonism and bias toward fluoridation. The district court determined 
that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary, and that hearing was scheduled on 
August 7, 2003. 
On August 7, 2003, following the evidentiary hearing, the parties presented 
argument on the issue of attorneys' fees, and the court took the motion for fees under 
advisement. 
On August 8, 2003, the court convened a telephone conference with counsel and 
issued a verbal order denying the Motion for Attorneys' Fees, with a request that the 
County Attorney draft an order and submit it for signature. (R. at 875.) 
Plaintiff reviewed the County Attorney's draft order, filed on August 29, 2003 (R. 
at 832), and submitted its own proposed alternative findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and order, on September 10, 2003. (R. at 834.) 
The district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions, of Law, and Order (a 
verbatim copy of the draft submitted by the County Attorney), which incorporated the 
findings and conclusions of the court's October 15, 2002 Ruling, on October 3, 2003. (R. 
at 852.) 
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On October 31, 2003, Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal from the district court's 
decision denying Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees. No other portion of the court's 
Order has been appealed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, the district court erred by grafting two requirements onto the Private 
Attorney General Doctrine which go beyond the Utah Supreme Court's Stewart 
formulation and create a different legal standard. As a matter of law, the district court 
concluded that the instant case could not be deemed "extraordinary" (even though the 
court found it to be "unique") within the Stewart context because: (1) no common fund 
was created from which attorneys' fees could be paid and no monetary benefit was 
conferred upon those who benefited from the decision; and (2) the county officers who 
placed an unlawful and unconstitutional petition on the ballot were not acting in bad faith 
or because of bias. Neither of these additional standards is required under Stewart, and 
neither is a requirement under the cases cited by the Utah Supreme Court as rationales for 
its adoption of the Private Attorney General Doctrine. Moreover, the instant case meets 
the Stewart criteria in that the Plaintiff successfully vindicated strong and societally 
important public policies by challenging the improper acts of the county officers and 
maintaining the integrity of the ballot. But for Plaintiffs lawsuit, the county officers, 
who opposed water fluoridation and wanted a revote of the issue, would have succeeded 
in doing so through an unlawful and unconstitutional scheme. 
n 
Second, the district court erred by using its two improper Stewart standards to 
justify a "finding of fact" (actually a conclusion of law) that voting rights do not rise to 
the "extraordinary" context of Stewart, and therefore while the instant case was "unique" 
and of "great public importance," it did not rise to the Stewart level. However, in making 
that "finding of fact," the district court ignored its previous findings and conclusions that 
the instant case presented unique issues of great importance to the general public, Davis 
County voters, and the [15] cities who must implement fluoridation; that it raised 
important and unique issues concerning the right of the people to legislate directly; that 
allowing the unlawful petition to go on the ballot would render the referenda provisions 
of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code meaningless; that allowing the unlawful petition 
to go on the ballot would subvert the Plaintiffs efforts and Davis County voters by 
allowing petition sponsors to misuse the peoples' direct legislative power to subvert the 
will of the majority; and that the public and Davis County voters have a real and 
substantial interest in ensuring that the laws of initiative and referenda are scrupulously 
followed. The denial of attorneys' fees was therefore based on an erroneous conclusion 
of law. The district court's inconsistent descriptions of the unique, important, and 
extraordinary nature of the case relied upon distinctions without a difference, and were 
simply arbitrary. 
Third, while bias or bad faith are not required for an award of attorneys' fees 
under Stewart, the evidence presented shows a continuing pattern of bias by the County 
Clerk, who is an avowed fluoride opponent, and who tilted the decision process at every 
12 
juncture to allow an unlawful revote petition to go on the ballot. The district court's 
blanket and general finding of fact that there was no bias and that the Clerk relied on the 
advice of counsel at every stage of the process is not supported by the evidence, much of 
which consisted of the unrefuted and unrebutted admissions of the Clerk and his legal 
advisors, as well as a complete lack of any supporting records the Clerk was legally 
responsible to maintain. The district court's blanket absolution of the Clerk for acting 
beyond his statutory scope of authority exceeds the limits of reasonability and was 
arbitrary in the face of the evidence. No specific findings support the court's 
conclusions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY 
CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DOCTRINE UNLESS: (a) PLAINTIFF'S SUCCESSFUL ADVOCACY OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS OF THE 
MAJORITY OF VOTERS WHO APPROVED PUBLIC WATER 
FLUORIDATION RESULTS IN A MONETARY BENEFIT AND CREATES 
A COMMON FUND OUT OF WHICH FEES CAN BE PAID; AND (b) THE 
ACTIONS OF COUNTY OFFICERS ARE UNDERTAKEN IN BAD FAITH. 
When private citizens and their lawyers successfully vindicate important 
constitutional and statutory rights in behalf of the public at large, who should bear the 
burden of the citizens' attorneys' fees? More particularly, where the taxpayers' resources 
are wholly funding the defense of an unconstitutional or unlawful action, is it equitable 
and just that the few citizens willing to go up against the government bear that financial 
burden themselves where a court rules that the government erred? 
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The Private Attorney General Doctrine enunciated in Stewart v. Utah Public 
Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994) provides an equitable remedy in such 
instances. The essential facts of Stewart are strikingly similar to the instant case: the 
public agencies charged to regulate utilities all signed off on an unlawful rate plan; 
private citizens were the only ones left to challenge the unlawful plan; but for the 
plaintiffs successful appeal, the unlawful scheme would have remained in place; and the 
private plaintiffs thus successfully vindicated an important public policy. 
A. In Stewart, The Government Officers AH Joined To Support An Unlawful 
Rate Plan. 
In 1990, U.S. West proposed an incentive rate regulation plan in which 
shareholders and ratepayers would share company profits in excess of a specified rate of 
return on equity. Id. at 762. U.S. West, the Division of Public Utilities, and the 
Committee of Consumer Services then presented the Public Service Commission with a 
stipulation agreeing to the U.S. West incentive plan. The Commission made certain 
findings as a prelude to rejecting the stipulation, but then adopted a rate incentive plan of 
its own without a hearing or argument. Id. at 763-766. A group of private citizens 
appealed the Commission's Order, and challenged the lawfulness of the rate of return 
U.S. West had been granted. As Justice Stewart noted, "In this proceeding, the 
Commission and the Division of Public Utilities have aligned themselves with U.S. West. 
The Committee of Consumer Services intervened in the proceedings before the 
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Commission, but has taken no position on this appeal and has not appeared as a party." 
Id. at 762. 
In Stewart, the regulated utility, the Commission, the Division, and the Committee 
agreed with an incentive rate plan which only the customers argued was unlawful and 
unconstitutional. When the customers appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, the utility, 
the Commission, and the Division all appeared against the customers as opposing parties, 
and the one state entity specifically charged by statute to represent the interests of 
residential and small business customers made no appearance and took no position. The 
customers were entirely on their own. They hired their own private attorneys, and in the 
end they prevailed on the merits. The Utah Supreme Court held that the rate plan was 
illegal. 
The Court applied the Private Attorney General Doctrine to award the Stewart 
plaintiffs their attorneys' fees: 
Courts also have awarded attorney fees to a party as a "private attorney 
general" when the "vindication of a strong or societally important public policy" 
takes place and the necessary costs in doing so "transcend the individual plaintiffs 
pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization [citing Serrano v. Priest 569 
P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 1977)]. Id. at 783. 
There is no doubt that the plaintiffs in this case have conferred substantial 
benefits on all [U.S.West] ratepayers. Based on the authorities discussed above, 
we conclude that the facts before us warrant an award of attorney fees to 
plaintiffs' counsel under this court's inherent equitable powers. Id. at 783. 
To the extent [on remand] the Commission finds, after consideration of the 
effects of today's ruling on the rate proceeding before it, that [U.S. West] must 
disgorge overcharges pursuant to an exception to the rule against retroactive 
ratemaking, plaintiffs award of attorney fees should come out of that fund 
[citations omitted]. Id. at 783. 
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In the alternative, if no such fund is created, we find that the private 
attorney general exception to the American rule is applicable to this case and 
that [U.S. West] should be ordered to pay those fees. Id. at 783, emphasis added. 
As set out throughout this opinion, plaintiffs have successfully vindicated 
an important public policy benefitting all of the ratepayers in the state. Plaintiffs, 
a handful of ratepayers acting entirely on their own, took on [U.S. West], the 
Public Service Commission, and the Division of Public Utilities and have 
succeeded in having the Commission's rate of return set aside as unlawful, section 
54-4-4.1(2) declared unconstitutional, and the Commission's "incentive" plan held 
invalid. It is significant that the Committee of Consumer Services, which by 
statute is charged with the responsibility of representing consumer interests, made 
no appearance at all on this appeal and that the Commission and the Division of 
Public Utilities have opposed the ratepayers on all issues. Id at 783. 
The results achieved by the ratepayers will necessarily benefit all [U.S. 
West] ratepayers in the state of Utah especially as to future rates, irrespective of 
whether a refund of past overcharges might ultimately be ordered.. Here, [U.S. 
West has collected rates under a rate of return that is unlawful. . But for the 
plaintiffs9 action, all that would have been unchallenged. . In the absence of a 
common fund, and under these circumstances, it is appropriate to require the 
shareholders of [U.S. West] to pay the cost of plaintiffs9 reasonable attorney 
fees. Id. at 783, emphasis added. 
B. Like the Stewart Government Officers, The Davis County Government 
Officers All Joined To Place An Unlawful Revote Petition On The Ballot, 
Leaving No One To Defend The Rights Of The Majority Of Voters. 
In the instant case, 44,403 Davis County voters, a 52% majority in the November 
7, 2000 general election, enacted water fluoridation as the law in Davis County pursuant 
to a resolution placed on the general election ballot by the County Commission under 
authority granted in Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-11 l(l)(c). That 2000 fluoridation vote of the 
people was the very kind of direct legislative power the Utah Supreme Court addressed in 
Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1080 (Utah 2002). There, the court stated, "The 
power of the legislature and the power of the people to legislate directly through initiative 
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and referenda are coequal, coextensive, and concurrent and share 'equal dignity.'" The 
process of implementing that 2000 general election vote on fluoridation has taken three 
years to fully accomplish. 
In early 2001, a small group of anti-fluoride activists decided to circulate what 
they styled an "initiative petition" seeking a revote on fluoridation in the 2002 general 
election, using the identical language which appeared on the 2000 ballot. On May 1, 
2001, a week before their petition had even been formally submitted for circulation 
approval, the Davis County Clerk advised them that if they gathered the requisite number 
of signatures prior to the submission deadline, the petition would go on the 2002 ballot. 
The e-mail message stated: 
We are in concurrence that if all applicable election law requirements are 
met related to the filing of the petition [if filed on time with the necessary number 
of signatures], it may be accepted by my office as a qualified countywide initiative 
petition. (R. at 806, EX 9, emphasis added.) 
The Clerk, Steve Rawlings, an avowed fluoridation opponent (R. at 874-51), 
testified that as of that May 2001 date, he made no effort to evaluate the legality of the 
petition, relying on advice from the Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney, Gerald Hess, to 
accept the petition sponsors' request for petition forms (R. at 874-63, 64). Mr. Hess 
testified that, "When [a petition] is first filed, as you know, the Supreme Court has said 
that it's a ministerial act and you cannot block it, and that's the first point." 
2
 Mr. Hess was probably referring to Taylor v. South Jordan City Recorder, 972 P.2d 
423, 424 (Utah 1998), in which the court stated: "Any determination of whether the 
subject matter is appropriate for the initiative process is proper only after the petition has 
been issued, completed, and returned." (Emphasis added.) 
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The Clerk testified that prior to sending the May 1, 2001 e-mail message 
committing to place the revote petition on the ballot (R. at 806, EX 9), he had "not asked 
for a legal opinion about the lawfulness, I had asked Mr. Hess if we should [accept] that 
petition and grant the signature page." (R. at 874-63.) Asked if at that time Mr. Hess 
made no determination whether that was an initiative petition or a referendum, the Clerk 
testified "That is correct." (R. at 874-64.) 
Plaintiff agrees that the Clerk could not have refused to issue petition forms in 
May 2001, but Plaintiff maintains that the May 1, 2001 e-mail message reveals a 
continuing pattern of biased, anti-fluoridation conduct (going back to the 2000 general 
election) intended to tilt the process toward his personal desire for a revote (R. at 874-
52). The Clerk pre-approved the as yet unsubmitted petition by telling the petition 
sponsors that their petition would be "accepted by my office as a qualified countywide 
initiative petition" if "all applicable election law requirements related to filing [i.e. 
meeting the signature and filing time requirements] were met." (R. at 806, EX 9.) The 
petition was pre-approved for the ballot a week before it was even submitted for 
circulatory approval. The Clerk testified that a year later, in May 2002, he became a 
petition signer, along with the County Commission Chairman and the County Attorney 
(R. at 768; 874-64, 65). 
As in Stewart, the Davis County officers who were responsible to uphold the law 
enacted by the people in 2000, aligned themselves and the resources of the County in 
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support of an unlawful scheme - here, an unconstitutional and unlawful petition seeking 
to revoke the people's enactment. Those officers, who themselves had signed the petition 
denouncing the 2000 fluoridation vote,3 allowed the government's role as the ballot 
gatekeeper to be subverted at five critical stages: 
1. Neither the Clerk nor His Counsel Vetted the Petition for Legality 
Prior To July 8, 2002, When It Was Filed With Signatures. 
According to the testimony, no analysis of legality was made between May 2001 
and July 8, 2002. When asked whether he made any kind of legal analysis of a petition's 
lawfulness at the time someone applies for petition signature forms, the Clerk testified, "I 
do not. I turned it over to the attorney's office for that." (R. at 874-59.) The Clerk 
testified that petition signatures were coming into his office throughout the period 
November 2, 2001 through July 8, 2002 (R. at 874-123, 124.) The Clerk also testified 
that he made no analysis of whether the petition was an initiative or a referendum prior to 
July 9, 2002. (R. at 874-99.) He further testified: I was assuming it was an initiative 
petition right from the beginning." (Id.) When asked whether the fact that the petition 
came to him titled "Initiative Petition" was his basis for assuming the petition was legally 
an initiative petition, the Clerk testified: 
That would have been part of it, and Jerry Hess' comment to me that we 
needed to accept it. I just assumed that meant it was an initiative petition . . I 
understood that to mean that if all the timing deadlines were met and the proper 
3
 The petition itself made four unsubstantiated and highly inflammatory "findings of 
fact" about the fluoridation vote. These "findings" claimed that fluoride is a health 
hazard, that its risks had been kept hidden, that fluoridation is unconstitutional, and that 
the cost is astronomical. (R. at 806, EX 10, p.4.) 
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sponsors were there, that I needed to accept the petition and give them a signature 
page." (Id.) 
When the petition signatures were finally submitted for verification on July 8, 
2002, the Clerk still had made no effort to determine the petition's legality. His duty at 
that point in time, he testified, was to "count the signatures and send the petition on to the 
Commission." (R. at 874-98.). The Clerk just "assumed it was an initiative petition from 
the beginning." (R. at 874-99.) 
The Clerk also testified that during that same period, he had "a lot of discussion" 
with his assigned attorney, Mr. Hess, as it related to the initiative process. When asked 
if any of those discussions pertained to the legal sufficiency of the petition, the Clerk 
testified, "I don't recall." (R. at 874-125, 126.) When asked if there had ever been any 
discussions he could recall prior to July 8, 2002 that "referenced anything about this 
being, rather than initiative, a referendum," the Clerk testified, "Never." (Id. at 126.) The 
Clerk was then asked: . 
Q: When was the first time you ever, in the course of this process, were 
alerted to the argument that this might be a referendum rather than an initiative? 
A: When Mr. Hess forwarded a copy of Mr. Irvine's July 29th [2002] letter 
tome. (Id.) 
The testimony of the Clerk's assigned counsel, Mr. Gerald Hess, the Chief 
Civil Deputy County Attorney also confirms that no analysis for legality was 
conducted even when the signatures had been received on July 8, 2002, nor before 
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sending the petition to the County Commission on July 9, 2002. Mr. Hess was 
asked: 
Q: Where in all of this [process] does someone ask the question, is this a 
lawful petition? 
A: I suppose the Legislature could have given us the same authority that 
the Lieutenant Governor has to make that decision . . . as I understand the statute, 
there is not a requirement for that kind of decision to be made . . (R. at 874-159.) 
Q: Are you telling me that if someone files a petition that proposes that the 
voters of Davis County declare that Utah shall secede from the Union, doesn't 
anybody have the authority to say, this isn't a lawful initiative? (Id.) 
A: I believe that caselaw does, but I don't know that there is a statute that 
does. I think at that point, yes, the Clerk could make a decision that it was 
something . . . that could be withheld from the ballot. (R. at 874-160.) 
Q: Is it your testimony, Mr. Hess, that once the petition is received with the 
correct number of signatures by the Clerk, and they were counted up and totaled, 
that he did not have the responsibility to make an evaluation of the legal 
sufficiency of that petition? (Id.) 
A: I think the Clerk had the obligation to submit it to the County 
Commission. (Id.) 
The signature verification process was concluded on July 8, 2002. The following 
day, the Clerk certified the petition as "an initiative petition." At no time prior to that 
certification, did anyone in County government attempt to determine whether it was a 
legal, constitutional petition. That was the government's first failure in 2002 to protect 
the public interest. These unrefuted admissions are directly contrary to the district court's 
Findings of Fact Nos. 4 and 5 "that the Clerk sought the legal advice of counsel and 
followed it at all stages," and that all of the officers followed the advice of legal counsel 
and adhered to a position based on their interpretation of [the law]." The problem was 
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not just one of incorrect analysis; it was that no analysis was done before the petition was 
certified to the County Commission as something which it legally was not. 
2. The Clerk, Who Supported And Signed The Unvetted Petition, 
Certified It To The County Commission By Choosing A Statutory 
Option Which Virtually Assured Ballot Placement. 
The last petition signatures were received on July 8, 2002. On July 9, 2002, 
having made no analysis of the petition's legality, the Clerk certified the revote petition 
to the County Commission as an "initiative petition." (R. at 806, EX 12.) The Clerk also 
testified that he understood his only duty, following receipt of the petition signature 
sheets, was to "count the signatures and send the petition on to the Commission." (R. at 
874-98.) The Clerk's decision to certify the petition as an initiative, whether it was such 
or not, conveniently suited his personal interest in securing a revote. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 20A-7-501(3), the legislative body (the Commission), following receipt of 
an initiative petition, can either: (a) adopt or reject the proposed law without change 
within 30 days; or (b) adopt the proposed law and refer it to the people or adopt it without 
referral to the people; or (c) reject the proposed law. Subsection (d), however, provides 
the kicker: "if the local legislative body rejects a proposed county ordinance or 
amendment, or takes no action on it, the clerk shall submit it to the voters of the county at 
the next general election. There is no corresponding Subsection (d) "automatic ballot 
placement" provision for referenda. 
The Clerk knew when he sent the petition to the Commission that if the 
Commission rejected the petition or took no action on it, [the petition] would go on the 
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ballot. (R. at 874-106.) When asked if the law "operates as kind of a conveyor belt to the 
ballot," the Clerk testified, "Correct. Absolutely." (Id.) Contrary to the assumptions of 
the Clerk and his attorney, a different section of the local initiative statute does, in fact, 
contemplate a determination of a petition's legality at the time signatures are filed for 
verification, just as the law does for referenda. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-507(5)(a) states: 
If the local clerk refuses to accept and file any initiative petition, any voter 
may apply to the supreme court for an extraordinary writ to compel him to do so 
within ten days after the refusal. 
The same language applies to referenda, at Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-607(4)(a). When 
asked if the petition had been considered a referendum, and the Clerk had refused to send 
it to the Commission, or if the Commission had taken no action on it, "there was no 
automatic trip to the ballot for a referendum the way there would be for an initiative, is 
that right?" The Clerk testified, "I think that's the case." (R. at 874-115.) 
The Clerk failed to protect the public interest when he certified the petition to the 
County Commission as a legal initiative, which it was not, under a statute which would 
place the petition on the ballot even if the Commission rejected it or took no action. This 
failure to properly vet the petition's legality was not even a near-miss. The district court 
held that the petition not only was unlawful because it was "an untimely referendum 
petition," but the petition was unlawful "even had it been an initiative petition." (R. at 
283.) The County officers who signed the petition all wanted a revote, but they still had 
an obligation to the citizens as the gatekeepers to the ballot. Therefore, their failure to vet 
the petition for legality before launching it onto the ballot is inexplicable, except as over-
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eagerness on the part of the Clerk to accomplish his private goal of having a revote on 
fluoridation. This merger of private interest with public responsibility is the flip side of a 
problem addressed in Taylor v. South Jordan City Recorder, 972 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 
1998), where the court explained its reasoning for not allowing a clerk to refuse to furnish 
initiative forms, even if the subject matter is inappropriate for an initiative. Using a 
hypothetical assumption that a clerk might be opposed to a petition, the court wrote: 
"Under these circumstances, to give a clerk the power to make legal decisions about the 
propriety of petition requests and thus about the initiative petition's circulation is to invite 
abuse." In the instant case, the abuse of power came at the point where the Clerk elected 
to accept and file a petition as an initiative, with an almost automatic trip to the ballot, 
without vetting it for legality. His personal desire for a revote trumped his duty to vet for 
legality. 
3. The Clerk's Certification Of The Unvetted Petition To The 
Commission Assured That The County, Not The Sponsors, Would 
Underwrite The Costs In Any Lawsuit Challenging The Legality Of 
The Sponsors' Petition. 
The Clerk's certification of the unvetted petition also determined that the petition's 
sponsors would not pay the costs of defending its legality. If the Clerk or the County 
Attorney had questioned the legality of the petition and refused to file it after July 8, 
2002, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-507(5)(a), then the burden of defending the 
unlawful petition would have fallen on the sponsors of the petition. Had that happened, 
the resources of the County would have been marshaled to defend the integrity of the 
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2000 fluoridation mandate. Therefore, the Clerk's certification decision, without vetting 
the petition for legality, placed on Plaintiff the total burden and expense of defending the 
2000 general election results. From this point forward, the County would pay all of the 
legal fees for the petition sponsors, leaving no one but private citizens and their private 
attorneys to defend the lawful decision of the majority of voters and taxpayers. 
The July 9, 2002, Minutes of the County Commission (R. at 806, EX 13) state: 
Steve Rawlings, Clerk/Auditor, and Pat Beckstead, Election Coordinator, 
presented the Certification for the Initiative Petition Re-vote on Mandatory 
Fluoridation Act.. . The recommendation of the Commission is to forward the 
information to the Davis County Attorney Office for review and preparation of 
legal opinion to be given to the Commission on or before the next meeting of 
August 6, 2002. (Emphasis added. No opinion existed as of July 9, 2002.) 
The Clerk, the Commission, and the Board of Health all shared the same attorney for 
legal advice, Mr. Gerald Hess. (R. at 874-153.) 
4. The County Had Actual Notice Of The Petition's Illegality Before 
The Commission Allowed It To Go On The Ballot, But Even Then, The 
Officers Did Not Make A Correct Legal Assessment. 
On July 29, 2002, Plaintiffs counsel sent a letter to the County Attorney setting 
out Plaintiffs analysis that the petition was unlawful because the sponsors' recourse for a 
revote was through a referendum, and the time for filing a referendum petition had long 
since passed. That letter sufficiently alarmed the Clerk that he took two unusual steps. 
First, he sent his own recommendation (R. at 806, EX 11) on August 1, 2002, to his 
official attorney, Mr. Hess, stating that after study, the Clerk had determined that if the 
petition was not an initiative (even though "the petition filed does have the heading 
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"Initiative Petition"), "the petition could be constructively construed as having the intent 
of a 'Referendum Petition.9" The Clerk urged Mr. Hess to "consider" that alternate 
construction in rendering his legal opinion to the County Commission, even though he 
had no further decision-making responsibility for what became of the petition (R. at 874-
107). The second action then taken by the Clerk, because Mr. Hess had not responded 
quickly to the August 1, 2002 letter, was to turn to his son for a separate legal opinion 
about the petition's legality. Mr. Troy Rawlings is a deputy prosecutor in the Davis 
County Attorney's office. 
When the Clerk was asked when he determined that the petition could be a 
referendum, he testified: 
I never did make that determination. I received a copy of the letter from 
Mr. Hess that you [Plaintiffs counsel, David Irvine] sent to him that was quite a 
lengthy letter in which you outlined your feelings that it was not an initiative 
petition and was a referenda. After I received that letter is the time that I -
actually, my concern stemmed over possible litigation once again . ." (R. at 874-
106, 107.) 
Troy Rawlings, also a petition signer ("Yeah, you bet") (R. at 874-72), testified 
that the Clerk requested an opinion from him about the legal status of the petition, on or 
about August 5, 2002, because Gerald Hess "had not responded to the Clerk's letter to 
him dated August 1st (R. at 806, EX 11) and had "not responded yet to give [the Clerk] 
an opinion related to a referendum issue." (R. at 874-74.) 
Troy Rawlings testified that he advised the Clerk on August 5, 2002, that the 
petition "was a valid and timely filed referendum," (R. at 874-80) and that the Clerk 
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"should consider the petition to be a referendum." (R. at 874-81.) Months later, Troy 
Rawlings was still firm in that opinion, testifying in an affidavit he prepared [on February 
10, 2003], "I maintain at this time, as I did when asked by the Clerk/Auditor for my 
opinion [August 5, 2002] that the correct legal constitutional analysis is that the document 
in question is and was a timely filed referendum." (R. at 874-85.) 
Troy Rawlings also testified regarding his legal opinion and advice to his father 
regarding his father's duties as the Clerk: 
The caselaw and the statutes in question do not require the public official to 
determine the constitutionality of the initiative petition or referendum process 
used. As far as process is concerned, the local election clerk only need consider 
the requirements of the statutes as relates to timing, the signatures and name 
verification. Once that is done, the Clerk marks the front sufficient or insufficient. 
(R. at 874-81.) 
Speaking of his consultations with his son, after August 1st, the Clerk also testified: 
Even though I was not required by law to make a legal interpretation as to 
the validity of the petition, I did consult with legal counsel to determine that there 
was a strong possibility the petition could be constructively considered a 
referendum. (R. at 874-96, 97.) 
When asked what his legal basis was for concluding that he had no obligation to 
make a legal interpretation about the validity of the petition, the Clerk answered, "Mr. 
Hess." (Id. at 97.) However, the only specific advice from Mr. Hess to which the Clerk 
testified was advice given in April or May 2001, when Mr. Hess told the Clerk to accept 
the petition sponsors' request for petition forms (R. at 806, EX 9; R. 874-63), and at that 
time Mr. Hess had not given the Clerk an opinion about whether the petition was a lawful 
initiative petition. (R. at 874-64.) 
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Troy Rawlings' opinion on August 5, 2002 that the petition was a "timely filed 
referendum" was based on insufficient legal research. In February 2003, he discovered a 
1988 Utah Supreme Court decision that specifically invalidated his calculation of 
"timeliness" which he had urged his father to pursue. Referring to Tobias v. City of 
South Jordan, 972 P.2d 373 (Utah 1998), Troy Rawlings testified: 
[R]egrettably, I missed that case initially in August of 2002 because I had at 
my disposal, when my dad presented me the August 1st letter (R. at 806, EX 11), 
an unannotated section of the code .. I think Tobias is wrongly decided, but my 
opinion is irrelevant. (R. at 874-86, 87.) 
It is evident from these events and the testimony of Steve Rawlings, his son who 
gave him legal advice, and Gerald Hess, that the first and only effort to vet the petition 
for legality took place after July 29, 2002, when Plaintiffs counsel contacted the County 
Attorney about it. Mr. Hess, after the petition had already been certified to the 
Commission, then made his own analysis of the petition, and concluded it was a lawful 
initiative. Whatever may have gone into the County Attorney's legal analysis, when it 
was finally made for the Commission, it was incorrect, as the district court held, and the 
Clerk was never advised of anyone's doubts about the petition's legality. 
5. The Commission Allowed The Petition To Go On The Ballot By 
Default And Without Opposing Comment. 
The last opportunity for the County officers to bar the unlawful petition from the 
ballot, and place the financial burden of defending an unlawful initiative back on its 
sponsors rather than the taxpayers, was the County Commission meeting of August 6, 
2002. As stated in the minutes, the Commission received the legal opinion from Mr. 
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Hess that the petition was an initiative. (R. at 806, EX 1.) Mr. Hess took the 
Commissioners through the statutory options for petitions submitted as initiatives. Mr. 
Hess had previously told the Clerk that he was going to advise the Commission to take no 
action on the petition (R. at 874-77, 127, 128), and the Commission followed that advice. 
(R. at 806, EX 1.) Chairman McConkie stated that he felt "neutrality is in the best 
interests of the Commission," and he called twice for a motion and none was given. 
With that decision to not act, the Commission, knowingly, allowed the "go-to-
ballot default" of §20A-7-501(3)(d) to kick in. Neither Commission Chairman 
McConkie, nor the Clerk disclosed at the meeting that they were petition signers who 
wanted a revote. Nor did Mr. Hess disclose that the County Attorney was also a signer 
who wanted a revote. Prior to the Chairman's call for a motion on the petition, Plaintiffs 
counsel asked to be heard in order to rebut Mr. Hess' theory that the petition was a lawful 
initiative. The Chairman refused to allow Plaintiffs counsel to speak in opposition, and 
indeed, refused to allow any comment at all from the audience. (R. at 874-156.) As the 
Minutes state: 
The Initiative Petition is now sent to Steve Rawlings, Davis County 
Clerk/Auditor, for preparation of putting it on the ballot in November according to 
election law. Mr. Rawlings stated that his office will ask the attorney's office for 
the official wording and move forward to place it on the ballot. (R. at 806, EX 1.) 
As of August 6, 2002, the County government was four-square behind an unlawful 
petition and had placed it on the ballot, leaving only private citizens to defend the 
fluoridation law enacted by the voters in 2000. 
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C. The Instant Case Meets All Of The Stewart Criteria For A Fee Award 
Under The Private Attorney General Doctrine. 
The Plaintiff here, like those in Stewart, took on the government officers who are 
charged to protect the public interest, succeeded in having the petition declared 
unconstitutional and unlawful, and succeeded in barring it from the ballot in 2002. They 
preserved the integrity of the ballot and election process, which is a "public good" 
essential to all the 250,000 citizens of the County. All 18 water systems in Davis County 
are now fluoridated, consistent with the 2000 vote of the people, and the 15 cities charged 
to implement fluoridation were able to do so without the uncertainty of a possible revote. 
In its October 15, 2002 Ruling on the merits of the case, the district court held 
that: 
(a) the issues presented by Plaintiff are of great importance to the general 
public (R. at 280); (b) the lawsuit raises important and unique issues concerning 
the right of the people to legislate directly (Id.); (c) to allow the Initiative Petition 
to be placed on the ballot would effectively render the referenda provisions in the 
Utah Constitution and the Utah Code meaningless and allow the sponsors to 
subvert the important timelines established by the Legislature for referenda (Id. at 
282); the Davis County Clerk's decision to allow the Initiative Petition to be 
placed on the ballot violates Utah constitutional and statutory law governing 
initiatives and referenda (Id. at 284). 
In Serrano v. Priest 569 P.2d 1303, (Cal. 1977), which is cited in Stewart, that 
court wrote: 
In spite of variations in emphasis, all of these formulations [of the private 
attorney general doctrine] seem to suggest that there are three basic factors to be 
considered in awarding fees on this theory. These are in general: (1) the strength 
or societal importance of the public policy being vindicated by the litigation, (2) 
the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on 
the plaintiff, (3) the number of people standing to benefit from the decision. Id. at 
1314. 
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If the people's right to legislate directly is a sacrosanct fundamental right, the defense of 
what has been directly legislated is surely the vindication of a strong and societally 
important public policy. 
Following its description of the results achieved by the plaintiffs who challenged 
U.S. West and the state regulatory agencies, the court wrote in Stewart: "But for 
plaintiffs' action, all that would have been unchallenged and none of [U.S.West's] 
ratepayers would have had any relief." (Stewart, at 783.) The "but for" standard was a 
principal factor in the court's decision to deny attorney fees in Shipman v. Evans, 500 
Utah Adv. Rep. 9, [^24 (Utah 2004). In that case, the plaintiffs had not achieved success 
through any of their judicial claims (all had been dismissed and injunctive relief had been 
denied), and had not conferred a public benefit through a court order. The court 
distinguished the Shipman request for fees from Stewart on that basis. 
D. The District Court Erred By Requiring A Common Fund Or Monetary 
Benefit. 
A principal reason cited by the district court for denying Plaintiffs Motion for 
Attorney's Fees was that in the instant case, the court held that no monetary benefit 
accrued to the residents of Davis County because of the lawsuit undertaken by Plaintiff. 
In its October 3, 2003 Order, the district court made Finding of Fact No. 8 (R. at 854) 
that fees should not be awarded to Plaintiff because "the litigation did not result in a 
common fund being created from which attorney's fees can be paid . ." The centrality of 
that consideration was highlighted in these comments by the district court in argument: 
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THE COURT: Of course, in Stewart there were financial benefits that were 
given. There are no financial benefits here that have been testified to. (R. at 874-
205.) 
THE COURT: Oh, I agree, the Supreme Court recognizes that there's this 
Attorney General Exception if there's a vindication of important public policy, 
public right. But then in the application of that rule in this specific case, it was 
financial benefit that it seems to me was the most persuasive element. (Id. at 874-
207.) 
With respect, Plaintiff submits that the district court incorrectly equated "societally 
important public policy" with monetary benefit, which is not a standard of law Stewart 
imposed. There are a host of "societally important" public policies, beginning with the 
Bill of Rights, which, when government violates them, do not involve monetary benefit. 
The right to vote is a fundamental right to which no price tag is attached. The right of the 
people to directly legislate, according to Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1081 (Utah 
2002) "is sacrosanct and a fundamental right." However, that sacrosanct right doesn't 
involve money. The Stewart award of fees wasn't based on the fact that the successful 
plaintiffs put money in the pockets of ratepayers, although that was one consequence of 
the ruling. The critical language is the few sentences [Stewart at 783] where the court 
directed the Public Service Commission to require U.S. West's shareholders to pay the 
legal fees even if no money for refunds was to be had from a common fund: 
. . . if no such fund [accumulated overcharges] is created . . .Here, [U.S. 
West] has collected rates under a rate of return that is unlawful and was authorized 
by the Commission's unlawful "incentive regulation" order . . . In the absence of a 
common fund, and under these circumstances, it is appropriate to require the 
shareholders of [U.S. West] to pay the cost of plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The "societally important public policy" the Stewart plaintiffs vindicated was not a 
rate refund - indeed, the court was not sure there would even be one - it was the 
challenge to an unconstitutional incentive rate plan: the plan was an assault on the 
Constitution, irrespective of whether it raised or lowered rates. The district court's 
Finding of Fact No. 8, in the October 3, 2003 Order, that fees could not be awarded under 
Stewart because no common fund had been created, was a clear error of law. 
E. The District Court Erred In Requiring Bad Faith. 
In its October 3, 2003 Finding No. 8, the Court stated, ". . nor does the case, in 
the absence of evidence of bad faith, constitute an extraordinary case." (R. at 854, 
emphasis added.) That single sentence grafts another new legal standard onto the Stewart 
decision, for which there is no basis in the Utah Supreme Court's enunciation of the 
Private Attorney General Doctrine, nor in Serrano's. The district court used "absence of 
bad faith" to distinguish between "unique" and "extraordinary," but "bad faith" or "bias" 
or "abdication" were not even terms the Utah Supreme Court used in Stewart to describe 
the actions of the Public Service Commission and state regulators, yet it applied the 
Private Attorney General Doctrine notwithstanding. There was no finding in Stewart that 
the Public Service Commission was guilty of bad faith when it adopted an 
unconstitutional incentive rate plan - it was just mistaken. Exactly as the Defendants 
claim here for themselves, the Commission and the Division and the Committee in 
Stewart were all advised by their legal counsel and presumably followed that advice. In 
the Utah Supreme Court's view, they got the law wrong, and "good intentions" or 
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"following the advice of counsel" did not excuse adoption of an unlawful rate plan or 
preclude an award of attorneys' fees to the citizens who successfully challenged the 
unlawful plan. 
The district court's addition of a non-existent "bad faith" requirement to the 
Stewart decision, as a legal standard for defining the "exceptional" or "extraordinary" 
result of a case was an error of law. 
II. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER THE PRIVATE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL DOCTRINE BY CONCLUDING THAT THE 
CASE WAS "UNIQUE BUT NOT EXTRAORDINARY," IN DISREGARD 
FOR ITS OWN CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT: (a) THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFF ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO 
THE GENERAL PUBLIC; (b) THE LAWSUIT RAISED IMPORTANT 
AND UNIQUE ISSUES CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO 
LEGISLATE DIRECTLY; (c) TO ALLOW THE [UNLAWFUL 
INITIATIVE PETITION TO BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT WOULD 
EFFECTIVELY RENDER THE REFERENDA PROVISIONS OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH CODE MEANINGLESS; (d) 
ALLOWING THE [UNLAWFUL INITIATIVE] PETITION ON THE 
BALLOT WOULD PERMIT THE SPONSORS TO MISUSE THE 
PEOPLES' DIRECT LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THWART THE WILL 
OF THE MAJORITY OF DAVIS COUNTY VOTERS; AND (e) DAVIS 
COUNTY VOTERS HAVE A REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN 
ENSURING THAT THE LAWS OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDA ARE 
SCRUPULOUSLY FOLLOWED AND THE ELECTION PROCESS 
ADHERES TO THE RULE OF LAW. 
The district court's October 3, 2003 Order stated in Finding of Fact No. 7, ". . 
even though voting rights are a significant issue in the context of this case, such 
significance does not rise to the level envisioned by the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart v. 
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Utah Public Service Commission . . (R. at 854.) This language reflects the opinion 
expressed by the district court in the August 8, 2003 conference: 
THE COURT: While I find that voting rights are significant, I can't find in 
this case that it's the type of case envisioned by the Supreme Court in their Stewart 
decision. But Footnote 19 in the Stewart decision gave guidance that attorneys' 
fees should only be granted in extraordinary cases. In my view, although this is a 
unique case, it's not an extraordinary case. (R. at 875-7.) 
The district court's opinion in that respect was an erroneous conclusion of law. In 
its Footnote 19, the Stewart court stated: "In holding that the private attorney general 
doctrine applies here, we note the exceptional nature of this case. We further note that 
any future award of attorney fees under this doctrine will take an equally extraordinary 
case." (Stewart at 783.) 
The district court's Finding of Fact No. 8 of the October 2, 2003 Order (R. at 854), 
stating that the instant case is "unique but not extraordinary" is also aimed at Footnote 19 
from Stewart. However, given the language the district court used to describe the unique 
public importance of the case and its far-reaching result in the October 15, 2002 Ruling, 
the subsequent dismissive qualification used in the 2003 Order can only be read as an 
arbitrary distinction without a difference. A finding that a case is "unique" is tantamount 
to a finding that it is "extraordinary." The district court incorporated all of its October 
15, 2002 Ruling into its October 2, 2003 Order. That earlier language, which was not 
withdrawn or modified, or even distinguished, is instructive: 
. . the Court finds that the issues presented by plaintiff are of great public 
importance to the general public, Davis County voters and [the 15] cities within 
Davis County who must implement fluoridation. (R. at 280.) 
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This lawsuit raises important and unique issues concerning the right of the 
people to legislate directly. (Id.) 
To allow the petition to be placed on the ballot would effectively render the 
provisions in the Utah Constitution and the Utah Code meaningless . . (R. at 282.) 
The Davis County Clerk's decision to allow the Initiative Petition to be 
placed on the ballot violates Utah constitutional and statutory law governing 
initiatives and referenda. (R. at 284.) 
Allowing the Initiative Petition to be placed on the ballot would subvert the 
efforts of plaintiffs members and Davis County voters by allowing the petition 
sponsors to misuse the peoples' direct legislative power to thwart the will of a 
majority of Davis County voters. (Id.) 
. . the public and Davis County voters in particular, have a real and 
substantial interest in ensuring that the laws of initiative and referenda are 
scrupulously followed and the election process adheres to the rule of law. (R. at 
285.) 
Because of the important and unique issues involved in this lawsuit, the 
Court finds that the public interest is advanced by issuing an injunction. (Id.) 
There is no argument that the scope of the Stewart decision involved a utility 
operating throughout the state of Utah, whereas the instant case involved just the 250,000 
population of Davis County and its 15 cities and 18 water systems. However, the district 
court's leap from the laudatory language of 2002 to its constricted language in 2003, with 
no reconciliation of the cumulative findings of important public policy in 2002 to the 
stark "unique but not extraordinary" language in 2003 is unreasoned, unexplained, and 
arbitrary. Webster defines "extraordinary" to mean "beyond what is usual, ordinary or 
established; exceptional in character, amount, degree." Correspondingly, the definition 
of "unique" is "existing as the only one or as the sole example; single, solitary in type or 
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characteristics; having no like or equal." (Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 1989, 
dilithium Press, Ltd.) Indeed, Webster's Collegiate Thesaurus (1988, Merriam Webster, 
Inc.) uses the two words interchangeably, as synonyms. 
Moreover, it is hard to square the district court's dismissive nod to voting rights as 
a mere "significant issue in the context of this case, but such significance does not rise to 
the level envisioned by the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart" (R. at 854), with the Utah 
Supreme Court's soaring pronouncement in Gallivan that those same voting rights 
associated with direct legislation are "sacrosanct and must be maintained inviolate." Id. 
at 1081. 
The Stewart decision at Footnote 18 (p.782) also discussed the "substantial 
benefit" basis for equitable awards of attorneys' fees where a litigant obtains a decision 
resulting in the conferral of a "substantial benefit of a pecuniary or nonpecuniary nature." 
This Court amplified the substantial benefit theory in Levanger v. Highland Estates 
Properties, 80 P.3d 569, 576 (Utah App. 2003). While Levanger involved a derivative 
action under Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court cited Stewart as 
the basis for a "substantial benefit" award of fees where individual members of a 
homeowners' association sued on a complaint that the association had improperly 
amended the association's covenants, conditions and restrictions, and that the use of mail-
in ballots was improper. This Court awarded attorneys' fees of $41,325.15, and stated: 
We agree with the holdings of these cases and conclude that a non-
monetary benefit, including the promotion and vindication of shareholders' voting 
rights, can be a substantial benefit in the context of a derivative action . . We also 
agree with the trial court's observation that it would be inappropriate to attempt to 
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offset the non-monetary benefit conferred upon Highland Estates against the 
Levangers' attorney fees . . if courts were to engage in this process, it would 
discourage derivative plaintiffs from bringing actions to confer a substantial non-
monetary benefit upon a corporation or association because of the possibility that 
they would be required to bear the burden of all or part of the attorney fees 
incurred in bringing the action. (Id. At 576.) 
If, as a matter of equity, a fee award under the substantial benefit theory is 
appropriate where private shareholders successfully vindicate the charter and voting 
rights of a relatively small homeowner association, the equities cannot be less compelling 
where private citizens successfully vindicate constitutional and statutory voting rights of 
the public at large in a county of 250,000 people, 15 cities, and 18 water systems. To not 
do so raises exactly the discouragement which this Court wisely decried. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING NO EVIDENCE OF 
BAD FAITH, BIAS, OR ABDICATION OF DUTIES DESPITE A 
PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL AND IMPROPER OFFICIAL ACTIONS BY 
COUNTY OFFICERS OVER THE COURSE OF TWO YEARS IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR PERSONAL OPPOSITION TO FLUORIDATION, 
CULMINATING IN THEIR PLACEMENT ON THE BALLOT OF AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL REVOTE PETITION, AND 
THEREBY EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVING ALL DAVIS COUNTY VOTERS 
OF DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL DECISIONS 
REGARDING BALLOT INTEGRITY. 
While a finding of "bad faith" or "bias" or "abdication of duty" is not a 
requirement to justify an attorneys' fee award under Stewart, Plaintiff presented evidence 
of bias in a day-long evidentiary hearing at which the County Clerk and his legal advisors 
all testified regarding their actions from July 26, 2000, the time the fluoridation question 
was placed on the 2000 general election ballot, through the Clerk's placement of the 
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unlawful initiative petition on the ballot on August 6, 2002. The Clerk was personally 
opposed to fluoridation, and Plaintiff asserts that the documents and testimony show a 
consistent tilt on the part of the Clerk at every juncture where he could make an official 
decision which would promote his personal opposition to fluoridation. This became 
evident after the County Commission put its fluoridation resolution on the ballot in 2000, 
and it continued through the Clerk's 2002 critical actions and decisions about the petition. 
The district court's October 3, 2003 Order makes the following blanket, general, 
non-specific findings of fact (which were repeated as Conclusions of Law): 
Finding of Fact No. 4. (R. at 853) Additionally the Court finds that the 
defendant Clerk/Auditor sought the legal advice of Chief Civil Deputy County 
Attorney Gerald Hess at all stages of the initiative process and followed the advice 
of legal counsel and that he performed his duties and responsibilities as the 
Clerk/Auditor thought appropriate and in conformance with his good faith 
understanding of what the law was at the time. See also, Conclusion of Law No. 2 
(R. at 855). 
Finding of Fact No. 5. (R. at 854) The Court finds that the Defendants . . 
followed the advice of legal counsel and adhered to a legal position based upon 
their interpretation of the Utah Constitution, the . . statutes . . and documents filed 
by the petition sponsors. See also Conclusion of Law No. 2 (R. at 855). 
Finding of Fact No. 6. (R. at 854) The Court finds that there is no evidence 
of bad faith, bias or abdication of duties on the part of the Clerk/Auditor or 
Commissioners in the events of 2002 and the suggestions of bias from events in 
2000-2001 are simply not persuasive that the Clerk/Auditor abused or exceeded 
the scope of his authority as a public official. See also Conclusion of Law No. 1 
(R. at 855). 
Finding No. 7. (R. at 854) The Court finds that there was no evidence that 
the actions of the County Government was an attempt to subvert the rights of those 
who voted in 2000 . ." 
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The district court's blanket absolution of the Clerk's conduct is inconsistent with 
the unrefiited evidence as to four egregious matters indicative of bias: first, the Clerk's 
unauthorized injection of himself into the issue of fluoridation costs in 2000 and 2000, 
beyond the statutory authority of his office. Second, his improper use of the 2000 Voter 
Information Pamphlet to promote his own slanted point of view about fluoridation costs. 
Third, his improper use of the 2000 Voter Information Pamphlet to only address 
fluoridation while omitting any information about a sales tax increase which was also on 
the ballot, and which had a financial impact on Davis residents nearly six times that of 
fluoridation. Fourth, even after the voters enacted fluoridation in the 2000 election, the 
Clerk continued to agitate about costs with an eye to a revote and beyond the statutory 
authority of his office. Fifth, his failure to vet the unlawful petition for legality before 
certifying it as an initiative. 
A. Prior To The 2000 Election, The Clerk, Without Statutory Authority, 
Injected Himself Into The Issue Of Fluoridation Costs. 
In accordance with the authority granted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-
lll(l)(c), the Davis County Commission ("Commission") on July 26, 2000 adopted a 
resolution to place an opinion question relating to the fluoridation of all public water 
systems within Davis County on the 2000 general election ballot. (R. at 658, EX 1.) 
The County Clerk, Mr. Steve Rawlings ("Clerk"), was an opponent of fluoridation 
during the fall of 2000, and voted "No" on the ballot question. He also testified that he 
had "concerns about fluoride, and they relate mostly to cost issues," and that he also had 
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"concerns about personal freedoms" associated with fluoridation (R. at 874-51). When 
asked if he agreed with a "finding" in the voter initiative petition, which prompted the 
action herein, which stated: "True county-wide costs have not been disclosed, and recent 
cost estimates are astronomical," the Clerk testified, "I do." (R. at 874-67.) 
The Davis County government neither operates nor manages any public water 
systems. (R. at 874-12.) The County Commission has no authority to direct the affairs of 
incorporated cities and towns within Davis County (R. at 874-13), and the Clerk has no 
authority to audit the affairs of the cities and towns (R. at 874-14). 
Neither Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-1 nor § 17-20-1.7 makes the cost of water 
fluoridation in cities and water districts a matter of official concern for the Clerk or 
Auditor; however, the Clerk testified that "there is a provision in the code that allows the 
Auditor to check into any financial situation he deems necessary in the County." (R. at 
874-16.) Although asked to provide any such citation, even as a late-filed exhibit, the 
Clerk and his counsel did not do so. There is no such blanket audit authority into the 
affairs of separate political subdivisions. 
During the fall of 2000, the Clerk and his staff became actively immersed in 
gathering information about the costs of fluoridation to the cities in Davis County (R. at 
874-17), and queried not only other states about fluoridation costs, but also telephoned 
Mr. Scott Paxman from the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District to discuss the cost 
estimates Mr. Paxman had put together for the Board of Health (R. at 874-18). Mr. 
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Paxman had faxed his cost estimate data (R. at 806, EX 6) to the Clerk on September 21, 
2000 (R. at 874-29). 
The Clerk also instructed the election coordinator to "call all city and water 
districts to determine if they would like to submit estimates for my publication." (R. at 
874-18.) 
The publication for which the Clerk was gathering fluoridation cost information 
was the Voter Information Pamphlet his office published in late October 2000 (R. at 806, 
EX 2) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-402. 
The Clerk testified that the County Commission directed him to gather the 
information about fluoridation costs. (R. at 874-20.) He testified that the Commission 
Chairman [Dannie McConkie] "directed me at one time that I could get information from 
the rest of the cities," (R. at 874-21). However, the Clerk also testified that he was not 
aware of any record of such a discussion. (Id.) Nor did he or his counsel ever provide 
any such record, even as a late-filed exhibit. Plaintiffs counsel could find no such record 
in a search of the Commission Minutes for 2000. The Commissioners, singly or jointly, 
cannot confer authority on any county officer to act beyond the statutory jurisdiction of 
his office, and even if they could, they can only make such policy decisions in a public 
meeting and on the record. Since there were no records of the Clerk's claimed 
authorization to act as a fluoride cost arbiter, it must be presumed that no authorization 
was given. The district court's Findings of Fact simply ignore a series of ultra vires 
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actions for which no authority exists, nor was voted by the legislative body, nor was 
recorded. 
The official record of actions taken by the County Commission is the Commission 
Minutes, which the Clerk maintains (R. at 874-11). There are only two references in the 
Commission Minutes for 2000 which make any mention of the Voter Information 
Pamphlet. The first is October 2, 2000, which states: 
Mr. Rawlings announced that voter information pamphlets regarding the 
issue of fluoride that will be on the November Election ballot will be distributed in 
the near future. (R. at 806, EX 4.) 
The second is October 23, 2000, which states: 
Steve Rawlings, Clerk/Auditor asked that it be noted for the minutes that 
last Friday the Commission approved [sic] information pamphlet regarding 
fluoride was mailed to all registered voters. The pamphlets are also available at all 
city offices, libraries, WIC, and hopefully the COA centers of Davis County. 
There will be pamphlets available at the polling places. Within the courthouse 
there are pamphlets in the Commission, Treasurer, Recorder, and Clerk/Audit 
offices. (R. at 806, EX 5.) 
There is no record anywhere which indicates that the Commission ever saw or 
approved the Voter Information Pamphlet before it was printed and distributed by the 
Clerk. The Clerk testified that he was "uncertain" whether there were any other 
Commission Minute references in 2000 to the Voter Information Pamphlet (R. at 874-24), 
and he produced none. 
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B. The Clerk Used The 2000 Voter Information Pamphlet To Promote His 
Own Slanted Point Of View About Fluoridation Costs. 
The Clerk's Voter Information Pamphlet (R.806, EX 2) presented the text of the 
fluoridation question as it would appear on the ballot (Id., p.2), and one Argument 
Against Fluoridation (Id., p.4, 5), and one Argument For Fluoridation (Id., p.6, 7). In 
addition, the Pamphlet contained a page entitled "Preliminary Information," (Id., p. 3) 
which was prepared and inserted by the Clerk (R. at 874-26). This page purported to 
inform voters of the "Cost of proposed measure # 2," and it then provided a table listing 
only 4 of the 15 cities in the County. Costs for the 4 cities were shown as "Connection 
Fee Annual Increase," ranging from $12 to $31, and as "Base Rate % Increase," ranging 
from 17% to 22%. The page provides no other information about how those costs were 
calculated, what the base comparisons were, or what any actual water costs were. The 
Clerk's selected cost data exaggerated the cost of fluoridation with an eye to persuading 
voters that the cost was astronomical - a term used in the petition's Finding D, with 
which the Clerk agreed. (R. at 874-67.) 
Even though the Clerk testified that he possessed cost estimate data from the 
Weber Basin Conservancy District (R. at 874-18), (the largest water district serving 
residents of Davis County (R. at 874-34)), he did not include that District's estimate of an 
average per person per year cost of $2.00. He did not include that District's "Low Cost 
Estimate of $1.18 per person per year" (R. at 806, EX 6, p.3), nor its "High Cost Estimate 
of $2.10 per person per year" (Id., p.3). He did, however, state in his information that the 
44 
Davis County Board of Health had estimated that the average per person per year cost of 
fluoridation would be approximately $2.00 (R. 806, EX 2, p.3). In view of the 
controversy about fluoridation costs, it would have been useful (and more fair) for voters 
to have known that the much lower Board of Health cost estimate was aligned almost 
exactly with the cost estimate provided by the largest water system operator in the 
County. 
The Clerk testified that he was "not sure" whether any authority for his cost data 
page was found in Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-402 (R. at 874-26), and there is none. 
The discovery of the Clerk's own page regarding the costs of fluoridation, 
particularly the inclusion of only 4 of the 18 water systems in the County and the 
dramatically high numbers used by the Clerk, was a surprise to the County Board of 
Health and to its Chair, Dr. Beth Q. Beck (R. at 361, f7). The Interim Director of the 
Davis County Health Department during 2000, Mr. Richard L. Harvey, testified that he 
had never seen Page 3 of the Pamphlet prior to its publication in late October 2000 (R. at 
874-173). He also testified that the Clerk had never discussed with him any of the cost 
data included on Page 3 except for a sentence referring to the City of Fruit Heights (of 
which Mr. Harvey was Mayor) (R. at 874-174). The Clerk testified that he "did not 
recall" notifying the Board of Health that he intended to publish his own higher cost 
information in the Pamphlet (R. at 874-36), and that he "did not recall" any attempt to 
resolve the differences between his cost estimates and those of the Board of Health (R. at 
874-37). 
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Because the Board of Health believed the Clerk's cost data, as presented in the 
Voter Information Pamphlet, was inaccurate and slanted, it prepared an advertisement 
dated November 2, 2000 (R. at 806, EX 3), which was published in newspapers serving 
Davis County. Mr. Harvey testified that he researched and produced the advertisement at 
the Board of Health's request, "in reaction to the information that came out in the voter 
information pamphlet." (R. at 874-174, 175.) 
In contrast to the limited and selected cost data provided by the Clerk, the Board 
of Health's presentation of cost data was sourced and comprehensive, on a city-by-city 
and water district-by-water district basis. 
C. The Clerk Used The 2000 Voter Information Pamphlet To Only Address 
Fluoridation, While Omitting Any Information About A Sales Tax Increase 
Which Was Also On the ballot, And Which Had A Financial Impact On Davis 
Residents Nearly Six Times That Of Fluoridation. 
On August 28, 2000, the Commission adopted a resolution to place on the 2000 
general election ballot a proposal to impose an additional one-quarter cent sales and use 
tax on all sales and uses within Davis County to fund a "fixed guideway and expanded 
public transportation system" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-502. (R. at 658, EX 
2). This resolution and the fluoridation resolution were both on the same general election 
ballot. They were County Commission-sponsored resolutions. 
The Clerk's 2000 Voter Information Pamphlet refers to and contains information 
on only one of the two issues placed on the ballot by the County Commission. It is 
entirely devoted to the issue of fluoridation. It makes no mention of the sales tax increase 
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for transportation expansion within Davis County. The Clerk testified that he made no 
inquiry into the financial impact of the transit sales tax increase on the voters of Davis 
County (R. at 874-47). 
The parties stipulated to the accuracy of a calculation that the sales tax increase for 
transportation expansion in Davis County produced revenue during its first full year of 
collection in the amount of $6,665,986.50, and that such amount divided by a Davis 
County population of 250,000 yields a cost for the transit tax increase of $26.66 per 
person per year. (R. at 874-44; 806, EX 7.) 
The Clerk testified that Layton City estimated its fluoridation cost to be $4.50 per 
person per year (R. at 874-49). Mathematically, if the Layton estimate applied 
countywide, the total cost would be $4.50 times 250,000 people, or $1,125,000. The per 
person transit sales tax increase is 5.925 times higher. Yet, the Clerk's self-described 
"fiduciary duty to the taxpayers" did not extend to telling them that. 
D. Even After The Voters Enacted Fluoridation In The 2000 Election, The 
Clerk Continued To Agitate About Costs With An Eye To Influencing A 
Revote's Outcome. 
Even though the County operates no water systems nor has management 
responsibilities for any of the water systems in Davis County, the Clerk testified that in 
the early months of 2001, following the approval of fluoridation by the voters, he was 
still "following up on [fluoridation] costs, but not researching." (R. at 874-53). 
On January 8, 2001, the Clerk sent a letter (R.806, EX 8) to the new Director of 
the Health Department, Mr. Lewis Garrett, reiterating the Clerk's concerns about the 
47 
costs of fluoridation, providing general cost information from three sources researched by 
the Clerk, and requesting an opportunity to "further discuss this information or other 
information that we have on file." In his testimony, the Clerk admitted that by January 
2001, what he had described as his "fiduciary duty to the voters to provide them with cost 
information" was over." (R. at 874-55.) 
When asked what authority he had after the 2000 election to continue to be 
concerned about fluoridation cost, the Clerk testified: 
As Risk Manager for the year, we are heavily involved in trying to 
determine how we can alleviate or eliminate potential risk to the County. One of 
those risks . . . was related to the potential of cities coming back on the County 
because the costs were coming in higher than the Board of Health indicated they 
would be, and it relates to potential litigation and potential risk. (R. at 874-56.) 
The Clerk testified that he, personally, wanted to see the fluoridation issue revoted 
(R. at 874-52). He also testified that on April 10, 2001 he became aware that there were 
people in Davis County interested in petitioning for a revote" (R. at 874-52, emphasis 
added). 
The Clerk testified that on April 13, 2001, he sent a letter to [County] 
Commissioner Cragun "informing him of past events and asking for his thoughts on the 
controversial issue related to the cost to implement fluoridation." (R. at 874-57.) After 
citing some of his research claiming to document high fluoridation costs in other states 
and countries, the Clerk "asked the Commission to sanction an independent cost study 
before they made a decision to put the question to a vote." (R. at 874-58, emphasis 
added.) When asked what statute gave him authority to request such a cost study, the 
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Clerk testified, "The one that I mentioned earlier that allows the auditor to check into any 
situation he deems necessary." (R. at 874-59). No such statute was ever produced. 
Moreover, it is clear from this timeline that as of April 10, 2001, the Clerk anticipated a 
revote via a petition process - which he supported - and for which he wanted the County 
to finance a cost study to be used in a future fluoridation campaign, as he requested on 
April 13, 2001. Because it operates no water systems nor has management authority for 
any water systems, the County had no legitimate basis for financing the cost study sought 
by the Clerk. 
E. In His Eagerness To Get A Revote Of Fluoridation, The Clerk Rushed The 
Petition To Certification And The Go-To-Ballot Process For Initiatives 
Without Vetting The Petition For Legality. No Vetting Occurred Until After 
The Petition Had Been Certified, And Even Then, The Clerk Tried To Change 
The Nature Of The Petition To Conform To His Erroneous Interpretation Of 
The Law. 
The testimony of the Clerk and his two legal advisors with regard to the events 
associated with their actions and non-actions as to the petition, together with the 
document trail they established, have been cited previously in this brief at pages 17-29. 
That narrative shows, based on the unrefuted admissions of the Clerk and his two 
counsel, that no vetting of the petition took place until after July 29, 2002. By then, the 
petition had been certified under a statute which assured that it would be on the ballot 
even if the Commission took no action on it, which is exactly what happened. The 
district court's findings that the Clerk sought legal advice at all stages of the petition's 
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progress onto the ballot are unsupported and contradicted by the admissions of the Clerk 
and his legal advisors. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court denying 
Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees should be reversed. Since the Defendants have not 
contested the reasonableness of the fee award requested by Plaintiff, this Court should 
declare that the Plaintiff has made a sufficient claim for attorneys' fees under the Private 
Attorney General Doctrine or the Substantial Benefit Doctrine. If this Court decides in 
Plaintiffs favor, Plaintiff also requests that it be awarded its attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred with respect to this appeal. 
DATED this 18th day of June, 2004. 
David R. Irvine 
Janet I. Jenson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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delivery, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the 
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Melvin C. Wilson, Esq. 
Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
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